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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENNJ1~TT ~IO'TOR COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, I 
vs. 
Jl.ARK L. LYON, THE TRAVEL- . Case No. 
EI-tS IN~URANCE COMPANr.-, \: 9680 
a corpora bon, D f d t e en an s, 
c·N ITED S TATE S FIDELITY 
AND GL:ARANTY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Responde,nt . . 
1\.PPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, UTAH 
HONORABLE MARCELLUS K. SNOW, 
JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant to recover 
from each of the defendants plaintiff-appellant's dam-
ages occasioned by the destruction of a motor vehicle 
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truck sold by the appellant to the defendant Mark L~ 
Lyon, which truck was insured by the defendants 
Travelers Insurance Cmnpany and United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Company. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment 
in favor of the defendant United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co., the plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment in favor 
of the defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co. and judgment in its favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 15, 1958, the defendant Mark L. Lyon 
purchased from the appellant a 1957 Ford 8 T 700 
Dump Truck for the price of $10,700.00 (Exhibit 
No. I ) . Title to the motor vehicle was retained by 
Bennett Motor until full payment was made in accord-
ance with the terms of the conditional sales contract 
(Exhibit No. 1). On September 7, 1960, the defendant 
Mark L. Lyon owed appellant $8,143.34 on the con-
ditional sales contract (Exhibit No. 6). 
On October 21, 1960, the defendant Lyon inten-
tionally destroyed the motor vehicle by setting it afire 
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·or 
I~ 
·or~ 
Jll' 
(Finding X o. 8, R. 56 and H. ~07). Plaintiff has 
obtained a default judgment against the defendant 
~[ark L. Lyon. which is unsatisfied (R. 37, 38. 39). 
The District Court dismissed plaintiff-appellant's 
complaint against the defendant The Travelers In-
surance Company upon stipulation of the said defend-
ant and appellant (R. 173, 174, 175). This stipulation 
provided that any judgment which may be recovered 
against the defendant United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co., respondent, would be reduced by one-half in 
consideration of' the stipulation dismissing The Trav-
elers Insurance Co. 
Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co. issued an automobile-liability and physical dan1age 
policy No. C1569348 on December 16, 1959, insuring 
the dump tllick (Exhibits No. 2 and No. 18). The 
named insured in the insurance policy was the defendant 
Mark Lyon, and an endorsement contained a loss-pay-
able clause in favor of the plaintiff Bennett l\iotor Co. 
(Exhibit No. 3). 
The loss payable clause in favor of plaintiff (Ex-
hibit 3) contains two clauses applicable to this appeal. 
It provides that: 
"Loss or damage, if any, under the policy shall 
be payable as interest may appear to lienholder 
Bennett l\Iotor Company, 47 West 6th South, 
and this insurance as to the interest of the Bail-
ment Lessor, Conditional Vendor or Mortgagee 
or Assignee of Bailment Lessor, Conditional 
, ... endor or Mortgagee (herein called the Lien-
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holder) shall not be invalidated by any act or 
neglect of the Lessee, Mortgagor or Owner of 
the within described automobile nor by any 
change in the title or ownership of the J?roperty; 
provided, however, that the conversiOn, em-
bezzlement, or secretion by the Lessee, Mort-
gagor or Purchaser in possession of the property 
insured under a bailment lease, conditional sale, 
mortgage or other encumbrance is not covered 
under such policy, unless specifically insured 
against and premium paid therefor;** * ." 
And the loss payable clause also has this provision: 
"The company reserves the right to cancel 
such policy at any time as provided by its terms, 
but in such case the Company shall notify the 
Lienholder when not less than 10 days thereafter 
such cancellation shall be effective as to the in-
terest of said lienholder therein * * * . " 
The policy itself has no provision for notice to the 
loss payable payee, but in paragraph 24 on cancellation 
provides: 
" * * * This policy may be cancelled by the 
Company by mailing to the Named Insured at 
the address shown in this policy written notice 
stating when not less than 10 days thereafter 
such cancellation shall be effective. The mailing 
of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of 
notice. * * * " 
Mr. Dan Firmage, Loan Officer and Insurance 
Clerk at 'Valker Bank & Trust Co. (R. 68) testified 
that his company has no insurance policy or notice 
of cancellation of any policy involved in this action 
(R. 70-71) and no evidence that it had ever received 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a notice of eancellation ( R. 70-71). It took an assign-
Inent of the conditional sales contract on r\ugust L3, 
1 U58, and returned that contract to appellant, after 
pay-off hy appellant, on November 4, 1960 (R. 69 
and see R. 92 as to the date) . 
.c\lene K. Dobbs, insurance clerk for appellant at 
the ti1ue of the loss occasioned herein and employed by 
Bennett ~1otor until October 31, 1961 (R. 72), tes-
tifie<l it was her duty "to see that all vehicles that were 
in 11ennett Finance were covered by insurance" ( R. 72) . 
4 \ll 1natters concerning insurance of covered vehicles 
came to her attention (R. 72). The witness was asked 
if she had examined the file of Bennett Motor Co. on 
the :\Iark L. Lyon vehicle, and she stated that she had 
( R. 73). She stated that she had no recollection of ever 
receiving a notice of cancellation similar to Exhibit 4 
(R. 73-7-1!). She testified: 
"Q. Upon receipt of such notices, what is your 
custom to do? 
A. Well, the first thing would be to inform Mr. 
Yergensen, who is my superior, that a can-
cellation had been issued on one of our cus-
tomers, and then, from there, we would 
proceed to inform the insured that we had 
received such cancellation, and ask that they 
make sure that they have insurance coverage. 
Q. 'Vhat was it your custom to do with the 
notice of cancellation itself? 
.A.. To put that in the file--the personal file. 
Q. And there is in the file one policy to which 
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is attached the notice of cancellation; isn't 
there? 
A. That's right; yes." (R. 74). 
"'Q. Now, you have testified that, if notice of 
cancellation were received, as to any auto-
mobile, other action would follow? 
A. That's right, sir. 
Q. Was there any other action that you know 
of, or that you can recall, connected with 
Mark Lyon? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you have a specific recollection as to the 
Mark Lyon file? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that one of the buyers that had come 
to your personal attention 1 
A. Yes, sir." (R. 77-78). 
Mr. Virgil G. Yergensen, the Office and Credit 
Manager of appellant, testified that he had responsi-
bility of insurance coverage on automobiles ( R. 79-80). 
He was responsible for collection of the Mark Lyon 
account, which was assigned to \V alker Bank ( R. 80). 
lie testified that the defendant Lyon was behind in his 
payments continually under the conditional sales con-
tract ( R. 82) . He testified as to the office procedure 
of Bennett Motor and as to how he would have been 
notified had the Notice of Cancellation been received 
in the Mark Lyon matter, and his responsibilities to see 
that there was insurance coverage. He stated that he did 
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~: 
t-
not reeeive ~ oti('<: of Cancellation on the ~lark l..~yon 
insurance policy with the respondent ( R. 83) . He 
stated that he did not learn until after the accident 
that respondent was the insurance cmnpany involved 
( R. 83-84). He testified that an agent of Travelers 
Insurance Co. informed him that Travelers insured the 
loss and not the respondent U.S.F. & G. (R. 84). 
"Q. You conducted all negotiations with Trav-
elers about this? 
.A. No. I didnt; talked to Mr. Burton Tingey 
of U.S.F. & G. 
Q. 1' .. ou have any correspondence with him? 
A. None. 
Q. He told you the policy had been cancelled? 
r\. He told me the policy had been cancelled. 
'V e found no evidence we had ever been 
notified. 
Q. When did he tell you that? 
A. Sometime in November. 
Q. Did he tell you there was notice of cancel-
lation in his file, or copy of one? 
A. He said he could .find none.-'-' (R. 110). 
The witness pointed out that Jlr. Tingey said he 
would look into the matter and find out about it (R. 
117) as follows: 
"Q. ~Ir. Yergensen, you started to give a con-
versation with Mr. Tingey; you said that he 
told you he would make inquiry and get in 
touch with you, I believe. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Did he do that? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. How much later? 
A. Approximately a week. 
Q. Did you talk to him the second time on the 
telephone? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or in person? 
A. Both times. 
Q. Both times on the telephone? 
A. Right. 
Q. What was your conversation the second 
time? 
A. Mr. Tingey called up, said he was calling 
in reference to that inquiry I had made and 
he said he had gone to Heber J. Grant's 
files, and failed to find any indication that 
we (he) had been notified of the cancella-
tion of policy." (R. 118). 
The defendant ~lark L. Lyon testified that the 
only notice of termination or suspension or cancellation 
from the respondent U.S.F. & G. was a suspension of 
insurance dated December 31, 1959 (R. 127). ~Ir. 
Lyon testified that he had never received a notice re-
sembling Exhibit 4 (R. 128). On April 7, 1960, he 
was living at the address shown on Exhibit 4 (R. 128). 
Regina Lyon, the wife of defendant Mark L. 
Lyon, was shown E~xhibit 4 and asked whether or not 
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D' 
1 
n~ 
a docutnent resembling this was ever receiYed by her 
at the 'Vest Jordan address in April of 1960. She 
stated: 
"Q. Did a copy of something similar to this come 
to the home in West Jordan? 
A. Not that I am aware of, no." (R. 152). 
Nina l\Iarie Roberts, Endorsement and Cancella-
tion Clerk at the Heber J. Grant Co. (R. 189), was 
asked as to Mark L. Lyon's insurance policy-Exhibit 
No.2: 
"Q. Do you have any me1nory concerning how 
it is you saw that? 
.t\. I sent out a cancellation notice on it. 
Q. To whom did you send it? 
A. To the insured, Mark Lyon, and also to the 
lienholder. 
Q. To the lienholder? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, do you have an actual memory in 
your mind at this time, Mrs. Roberts, of hav-
ing sent out to the lienholder, or are you 
basing that upon some other basis? 
A. I am not basing that on this actual lien-
holder. It is hard to remember as many as 
we send out each month. 
Q. You do remember sending a cancellation 
notice to Mr. Lyon, himself? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Now, what is your custom and practice, as 
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it was taught you when you started yol!r work 
and as vou continued to perform It, con-
cerning· cancellation noti~es, when you are 
instructed to cancel a policy? 
A. I take the policy, and I send out a cancella-
tion notice to the insured, and, also, we 
check the policy, and, if there is a loss-pay-
able or lienholder. we send out a cancella-
tion notice to them, also. 
Q. Is that a duplicate to one-you customarily 
send to the lienholder a duplicate of the one 
sent to the insured? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This is Exhibit 4, which is a photo copy of a 
document, Mrs. Roberts; do you recognize 
the document that it was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is it? 
A. It is the cancellation notice which was sent 
out to the insured, Mark Lyon. 
Q. And in the custom and habit and routine of 
your office, you would send an identical 
notice to a lienholder? 
A. Yes, I would. 
Q. So that there is no misunderstanding, you 
do not have an independent, specific mem-
ory of having done so to Bennett l\Iotor in 
this case? 
A. No; but I am sure that we did because we 
hold the policy for at least ten days after 
we have sent it out, and, at that time I 
check it over and make sure that there ~as 
10 
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a cancellation notice Inailed out to the in-
sured and to the loss-payable before for-
warding it down to the home office." (R. 
189, 190, 191). 
~lrs. Roberts testified that she is not the Inailing clerk 
(R. 191). She testified that she takes the mail to a 
mailing clerk who with regard to cancellation notices 
takes it to the post office without using a meter, but 
places a stamp on it and takes it over to the post office 
with a Certificate of Mailing (R. 192). She was asked: 
"Q. You have no recollection of mailing any par-
ticular cancellation notice, have you, :\Irs. 
Roberts? 
A. No. 
Q. Nor do you have any recollection as to 
whether in the Mark Lyon case, you de-
livered notice of cancellation to the mail 
clerk? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have no specific recollection of it? 
A. No, but they have the certificate of mailing 
to show it. 
Q. \.,.. ou know what your practice is; do you 
have the certificate of mailing with you? 
A. The U.S.F. & G. Company has it. 
Q. Do you have it with you? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you produce it ? 
A. I'm sure U.S.F. & G. can. 
11 
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MR. BIRD: Can you produce it, Mr. Snow? 
MR. SNO'V: I am trying to. 
MR. BIRD: You have it? 
MR. SNO'V: Not here; I didn't intend to put 
my case on today, Mr. Bird. In view of 
developments, I am forced to put mine in. 
I expected to go on tomorrow. 
TilE COURT: Now, if you want that, we cer-
tainly will give whatever leeway you need. 
If you can't proceed further without it, at 
this point, we can recess, as far as that goes. 
MR. SNO,\T: See how long takes with her. 
lVIR. BIRD: \V ell, I don't know why we are 
speculating about this witness, if we have 
the notice. Now, at the pre-trial, I asked 
for :any document in the possession of this 
company that would show mailing to Ben-
nett Motor Company; was advised they 
had no such document, and I am interested 
to know what they have. This is a surprise 
to me. 
MR. SNO'V: I ·will state for the record what 
the situation is. I have seen no document; 
I have heard this morning that there is one 
in Baltimore, Maryland, and I have tele-
graphed for it. If it gets here by airmail, 
we will have it; if it doesn't, we won't. I 
have never seen it; I don't know what it 
says. Don't know whether it will support 
my position here, or whether it won't. 
This morning, for the first time I heard 
. ' 
where tlus was, and asked my associate to 
telegraph for it. 
12 
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T II 11~ COURT:..:\ t such ti1ne as it becmnes avail-
able to you, you will make it available to 
the court and counsel? 
l\IR. SNO'V: Certainly; if it does not come in 
time, I would have all 1\Irs. Roberts has-
can find, I will have. (R. 193-194). 
~Irs. Roberts testified that she does not sta1np n 
cancellation on the policy and send it to the home office 
until she checks to see if the mailing notices have been 
signed and returned. She stated that the fact that the 
policy had been sent to the hmne office indicated to 
her in her routine that she did see a returned mailing 
notice (It. 199). Exhibit 17 is a blank form illustrative 
of the type of notice Mrs. Roberts testified to (R. 200). 
She testified that the certificate works as follows: 
"Q. 'Vould someone sign that? 
A. No; it is taken over to the post office, and 
there is a space there it says "Postage" and 
"Postmark." We place a stamp on this, 
attach it to the envelope. The envelope is 
taken to the post office, where the post-
master takes the letter, sealed, and stamps 
this, and gives it back to our mailing clerk, 
and she brings this back to the office, where 
we hold it for the ten days' waiting period. 
THE COURT: What is the receipt for? 
A. To prove mailing out in the mail. 
Q. (By 1\Ir. Snow) The postage-
A. There is a place here where we put a stamp. 
Q. .._c\. postage stamp? 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Yes; and that is stamped by the postmaster 
at the post office. 
THE COURT: That is your charge for their 
services, they received that piece of mail? 
A. Yes ; it was deposited in the mail to be sent. 
Q. (By lVIr. Snow) Merely shows it reached 
the post office; doesn't show beyond that?" 
(R. 201). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UNDER THE LOSS PAYABLE 
ENDORSEMENT, THE INSURER WAS RE-
QUIRED TO NOTIF'Y THE APPELLANT OF 
CANCELLATION. 
The District Judge made a conclusion of law that 
the insurance policy of respondent was cancelled and 
not in effect at the time of the loss (R. 56). This was 
presumably based upon Findings of Fact number 5 
and 6 where the District Court found that notice was 
sent to Appellant in the ordinary business routine and 
practice of respondent's agent, Ileber J. Grant & 
Company (R. 55). 
The proof offered by respondent indicates that it 
was of the opinion that mailing the notice of cancel-
lation was a compliance with the provision for cancel-
lation regardless of whether the Notice was received, 
or else it relied solely on the inference that the notice 
was received by the appellant from the purported proof 
of business practice in mailing. 
14 
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Appellant subtnits that the requirement of notice 
of cancellation to the insured under the policy itself. 
awl the requirement of notifying loss payable payee 
under the Loss Payable Endorsement were entirely 
different and that the latter required proof that the 
notice was receiYed. The cancellation clause of the policy 
was Paragraph 24 of :Exhibit ~. This "Standard Can-
cellation Clause" was before this Court in Diamond 1' 
lltah, Inc. 'l's. Canal Insurance Co1npany, 12 c·. 2d 
37, 40 ~ 3() 1 P. 2d 665, as to which this Court said: 
"The majority of these decisions, under what 
"·e believe to be the best reasoning, hold that the 
actual receipt of the Cancellation Notice by the 
insured is not a condition precedent to the can-
cellation of the insurance by the insurer, pro-
vided the Cancellation Notice itself contains a 
fixed date on which the cancellation is to become 
effective." 
..c-\nd the Court went on to observe that since the can-
cellation clause was not followed strictly, proof of mail-
ing was not enough. 
"Thus, Canal, not having strictly complied 
with the policy provisions, the mere mailing of 
the Notice was not sufficient proof of notice." 
But notice to the appellant is governed by the loss 
payable clause, which has no provisions as to mailing 
and provides instead: 
"'fhe Company reserves the right to cancel such 
policy at any time as provided by its terms, but 
in such case the Company shall notify the Lien-
holder when not less than ten days thereafter 
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such cancellation shall be effective as to the in-
terest of said Lienholder therein * * * ." 
Since there is no provision for mailing to the last 
known address or any other address, the language of 
the Diamond T case applies, and the respondent has a 
burden of proving that notice had been received. The 
independence of the Loss Payable Clause in establish-
ing the rights of the loss payable payee and the insurer, 
between themselves, is supported by Commercial Credit 
Corporation vs. Pren~ier Ins'ltrance Company~ 12 L~. 
2d 321, 366 P. 2d <i76. There the insured had given 
notice to the Company of cancellation of the policy 
and the insurer had made a settlement, but neither 
party had given notice to the loss payee, and this Court 
found the rights of the loss payee to be governed by 
the Loss Payable Clause. 
Insurance cases hold generally that where there 
is no contract as to the type of notice to be given or that 
mailing is sufficient, the burden is upon the insurer to 
prove that notice was received by the person being 
notified. United Assur. Asso. v. Frederick~ 130 Ark. 
12, 195 S'V 2d 691; Castner v. Farm,ers M.F. Ins. Co.~ 
50 Mich. 273, 15 N.,V. 452; Couch on Insurance 2d 
Section 32:108, page 328 of Volume 6, Giving as 
Against Receiving Notice. 
Under the theory of the Dia1nond T case~ respond-
ent's proof of a business practice or routine was sup-
posed to raise an inference both that the Notice of 
Cancellation was maj}ed to appellant and that appellant 
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received it. Appellant offered positive testi1nony that 
no Notice of Cancellation was received by it ( R. 73-7 4, 
77-78 & sa). .And also evidence that the X otice of 
Cancellation purportedly mailed to the insured Lyon 
was not received at his home by hi1n or his wife (R. 
1:27 & 1 ;3:2). Respondent takes the position, presumably, 
that the inference that there was mailing supports the 
inference that the Notice was received and survives the 
direct evidence of the appellant that the Notices were 
not received, and leaves an issue of fact which was 
resolved by the Court in favor of the respondent. 
Respondent must fail on this argument for the 
reasons that : 
I. There was no proof of mailing. 
:2. Failure to produce the mailing Certificate was 
fatal. 
3. The proof offered (Exhibit 4) did not include 
proof of notice to appellant. 
I. There was no proof of mailing. 
Appellant does not challenge the rule that it will 
be inferred (or presumed) that mail is delivered to the 
addressee by the Government where it is shpwn that 
n1ail properly addressed, with prepaid stamps, is placed 
in the United States l\Iail. It may also be admitted 
that the business routine of a substantial concern, show-
ing systematic mailing, is relevant to the proof (\Vig-
more on Evidence Section 95 citing Brown vs. Fraternal 
Association, 18 lT. 265, 55 P. 63). 
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But the respondent here offered no evidence from 
the person who was charged with the responsibility of 
mailing, and Mrs. Roberts did not testify that it is her 
duty to place postage on the notices. She only testified 
that: 
"We place a stamp on this, attached it to the 
envelope." (R. 201). 
In Matsko vs. Dally~ Washington~ 301 P. 2d 
1074-1078, the appellant had testified as to the existence 
of an office custom of mailing invoices, but had testified 
that he, himself, did not mail office correspondence 
and had no personal knowledge of mailing the par-
ticular invoice. Respondent denied receipt of the invoice. 
In holding that there was insufficient proof of mailing, 
the Court said: 
" ( 10) The rule is that, when an office handles 
such a large volume of mail that no one could 
be expected to remember any particular letter 
or notice, proof of mailing may be made by show-
ing ( 1) an office custom with respect to mailing, 
and (2) compliance with the custom in the spe-
cific instance. Lieb v. Webster, 30 "\Vash. 2d 43, 
190 P. 2d 701; Farrow v. Department of Labor 
& Industries~ 179 Wash. 453, 38 P. 2d 240. 
( 11) No office clerk or other person who cus-
tomarily mailed office correspondence was called 
to testify. Appellant has established an office 
custom but has failed to establish compliance 
therewith in the specific instance. Consequently, 
we hold that there is no presumption of receipt 
by respondent because there was not sufficient 
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evidence to establish the Inailing. Therefore, the 
court did not err in rejecting the proffered ex-
hibit." 
In the very recent case of 11exas l!Jmployees In-
surance Association v. JVerm.sl~·e, (Texas, 1962, 349 
S.\V. ~d 90, the Supreme Court held that testimony 
that a letter was prepared and placed on the secretary's 
desk for mailing was not enough: 
"The secretary did not testify in the case. 
\ Vhere the sender relies on office custom to sup-
port the inference of mailing, the n1ajority rule 
is that there must be corroborating circumstances 
to support the inference that the custom has been 
carried out." 
Likewise in State Bank of East Moline vs. Stan-
daert, 335 Ill. 519, 82 N.E. 2d 393-396, the Illinois 
Court reviewed the authorities and held that there must 
be smne evidence from the person whose duty it was 
to place the mailing pieces in the mail, and that dictating 
a letter as office custom of mailing is not enough: 
"From a review of the cases, however, it is 
evident that while Courts may not require the 
person mailing the letter for a large concern to 
have a distinct recollection of the particular 
letter, there must be some evidence on the part 
of the person whose general practice it was to 
post the mail that the custom was complied with 
on the date in question." 
'rhe annotation on this question at 86 ALR 541 
& 5-!-! supplements the earlier annotation at 2.5 ..~.-\LR 
13, and cites the majority rule as requiring that there 
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n1ust be a con1pliance with the custom such as evidence 
of the employee whose duty it was to take the letters 
for deposit and mail them that he actually did so, citing 
numerous cases, and at page 546, citing two cases indi-
cating that in Yery large organizations where recollec-
tion of mailing would be impossible, testimony from the 
actual mailing clerk would be cumulative only. The 
small office of Heber J. Grant & Company does not 
place it within the category of those cases. (See R. 
191). 
The case of Mohr vs. Universal C.I.T. Credit Cor-
poration (1958) 216 Md. 197, 140 A. 2d 49 at 52, holds 
that testimony as to the normal procedure of mailing 
to customers to the address noted on the record is held 
sufficient to raise a presumption of mailing without 
testimony from the person who actually mailed the 
letter, but the Court cites this as the minority view 
The mischief of this minority view lies in the fact 
that if a concern wants to prove mailing of a notice 
it need only offer proof that an item of business was 
handled in the ordinary routine and yet positive testi-
mony that the notice, or mailing piece, was never 
received raises only a counter presumption and leaves 
an issue of fact which may be arbitrarily resolved 
against the evidence. In this case there wasn't oppor-
tunity to examine the person who did the mailing and 
who might well have remembered this incident since 
the Mrs. Roberts who was called to testify said she 
remembered Inailing a notice to Mark Lyon (R. 190). 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:!. Failure to produce the mailing certifkate was 
fatal. 
Apparently the respondent was not satisfied with 
its ordinary routine Inailing custom and for that reason 
devised a In ore certain system of sending out Certificates 
of :\lailing such as the blank fortn Exhibit 11, to giYe 
proof in specific cases that the post office received the 
mailing piece (R. 197 and 200-202). Counsel advised 
the Court that respondent company had such a cer-
tificate and that it would be produced (R. 193 & 194). 
This statetnent of counsel was not evidence, and was 
sheer bravado in Yiew of the earlier testimony of tlH~ 
witness Yergensen that shortly after the loss occurred 
he had contacted l\lr. Burton Tingey of respondent 
corporation, who had reported back to him that there 
was no evidence in the files of the mailing of the Notice 
of c.ancellation to appellant (R. 110 & 118). 'I'hus 
the Yery document which respondent itself has estab-
lished in its routine and relies on as giving evidence of 
mailing was non-existent in this case and destroys the 
intended effect of testitnony as to the custom of mailing. 
Respondent is, therefore, asking the Court to infer 
frmu the testitnony as to the custom of mailing from a 
person not the mailing clerk that there was at one time 
eYidence of mailing in the file for this policy, and then 
to indulge the further inference that because a Cer-
tificate of )!ailing had once been in the file that would 
raise the further inference there had been an actual 
mailing of the X otice of Cancellation and the further 
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inference that the mail had been delivered. This is too 
tenuous to have probative value (See 95 ALR 162). 
3. The proof offered (Exhibit 4) did not include 
proof of notice to appellant. 
The witness Roberts identified Exhibit 4 as having 
come from the respondent's file in this case (or the 
file of Heber J. Grant & Company, which was re-
spondent's agent) and as giving evidence that under 
the office routine the Notice of Cancellation had been 
Inailed out. She testified: 
"I take the policy, and I send out a Cancella-
tion Notice to the insured, and, also, we check 
the policy, and if there is a Loss Payable or 
Lienholder, we send out a Cancellation Notice 
to them, also." ( R. 190). 
And then she testified that the notice to the lienholder 
would be a duplicate of Exhibit 4. But examination 
of Exhibit 4 discloses that the Notice of Cancellation 
is addressed to Mark Lyon, 3761 West 7800 South, 
West Jordan, ·utah, and there is no mention whatever 
of the appellant, or of any other lienholder. The only 
reasonable inference to be drawn from that Exhibit, 
and the denial by Appellant that any Notice of Can-
cellation was ever received is that as far as appellant 
is concerned, the office routine broke down and there 
was no checking of lienholder and no evidence that 
Notice of Cancellation was ever given to the lienholder. 
If such notice had been prepared, a duplicate would 
be in the file alongside Exhibit 4 or a notation made 
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on ~~xhibit 4 that a copy had gone to the lienholder. 
That is what Burton Tingey looked for but failed to 
find (It. 118) . 
..:\ nu1nber of cases are specific that where the copy 
produced from the file shows a particular address, or a 
wrong address, or the wrong person, the only inference 
that can be drawn from the testimony is that the original 
was Inailed, or attempted to be 1nailed, as shown on 
the file copy. nr alkcr Banll· & 'l'rust Company 'l.'S. Firs! 
S cl'urif.tf CorporationJ 9 U. 2d ~15 at 219, 3-1<1 P. ~d 
944 at 94G (wrong address) ; Fln7.L'Crs vs. Aetna Casu-
arf.tf lwntrcd ComJHl1Z/f, 163 F. 2d -1<11 (file does not 
show the address used); J{ikcr 'l'S. C.I.R., C1\ 4, :218 
F. :?d 389 (wrong address); Oli11cr vs. Fair Jn,.:clers, 
Inc. (Ga. r\pp.) 1:21 SE 2d 787; Selken vs . .~..Yorthland 
Insurance Comprlll.ff (Iowa), 90 X'Y ~d 29, H~. 388 
(wrong address). Respondent's proof, therefore, leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that if the office procedure 
was followed, a Notice of Cancellation was mailed to 
)lark Lyon and not to appellant. 
It thus appears that the denial of the appellant's 
employees that any Notice of Cancellation was received 
by it has raised a presumption or inference of non-
receipt. This is bolstered by the fact that had Bennett 
)lotor Cmnpany received notice that the insurance was 
cancelled, it would surely have taken steps to replace 
the insurance in order to protect itself, since the cost 
of the insurance would be borne by the insured, and 
not by it. 
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The shakiness of respondent's evidence on this 
point was indicated also by the vacillation of the trial 
judge. The first Findings of Fact included numbers 
6 and 7 and Conclusion No. 2, which found that no 
Notice of Cancellation was given to the appellant (R. 
35, 36) . These were served .January 27, 1962, and 
signed February 2, 1962. ~lu~reafteP, the F8Sp9Rd.8Rt 
(}Bj e~tefl t<:> the Fiudiug~ Thereafter, the respondent 
objected to the Findings and Conclusions (R. 43) .After 
argument, the Trial Court took the matter under ad-
visement and, without mentioning Notice of Cancella-
tion, approved respondent's proposals (R. 50). In 
support of the argument that the Court should change 
its Findings and Conclusions on this point, counsel for 
respondent had argued that since the case was going to 
the Supreme Court in any event, the Trial Court should 
give itself as broad a basis as possible with the Supreme 
Court and supply an issue of fact against appellant. 
The issue of law on appellant's right to recover after 
intentional destruction of the vehicle was not under con-
sideration on respondent's objections since the first 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by 
the appellant also held against appellant on that point 
( R. 35-36) . This argtunent, though not reported, is 
mentioned as having significance and as an explanation 
of why, against overwhelming evidence, the Findings 
on this point were changed. 
Respondent has failed to produce the mailing 
clerk to testify that the practice of mailing was reason-
able and was followed in this case, which is required 
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by the n1ajority of Courts; the respondent failed to 
pro<luee the Certificate of )!ailing which under its 
business routine is the one document which gives pro-
bative eYidence that the notice of the particular policy 
was delivered to the post office, properly addressed and 
with postage prepaid; and finally, the proof of the 
respondent includes a file copy of a X otice of Can-
cellation addressed only to l\Iark Lyon and giving no 
evidence that any notice was sent to the appellant as 
the loss payable payee or that any loss payable payee 
was notified. In view of the evidence of the appellant 
that the notice was not received, this Court should 
reverse the Trial Court and hold that no proof of de-
livery of notice to the appellant of cancellation of the 
policy was before the Court, and the policy was, there-
fore, in full force and effect. 
POINT II. IF MAILING ONLY \VAS RE-
QlTIRED, THERE IS NO PROOF THE NO-
TICE OF C.ANCELLATION \VAS l\IAILED. 
Respondent 1nay argue that the provision permitting 
notice to be mailed at the address shown in the policy 
is all that has to be given as to the insured and that 
the same proYision will be read into the loss payable 
clause. This is not tenable. Insurance policies are strictly 
construed against the company preparing and issuing 
the policy. Con~mercial Credit Corporation vs. Premier 
Insurance CompanJJ~ supra~· Huber & Rolland Con-
struction Company vs. Cif.lJ of South Salt Lake~ 7 U. 
2d :27H. 323 P. 2d :259. 
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But if the Court holds that proof of mailing was 
all that was required, then respondent has still failed 
in its proof for all of the reasons indicated under Point 
L It is said at 95 ALR 162, that Courts generally hold 
that an inference upon a dependent inference will not 
be per1nitted, citing innumerable cases, but that this 
statement of the rule is not entirely accurate. This 
annotation suggests that the real reason for the rule 
is that when a failure of complete proof makes necessary 
an inference of the missing fact, the evidence becomes 
too tenuous if that fact supplied by inference is then 
utilized as the basis for a further inference of another 
fact that cannot be proven. This reasoning applies in 
the case before the Court. Mrs. Roberts testified to her 
part of the office routine and then attempted to testify 
to the mailing portion, which was performed by an 
entirely different person as though that person would 
have testified in the same way; she also testified that 
C 'fi f M '1' c.u.sTf»~r•l"<.cl d f d erb cates o a1 1ng wereA1n t11e u e an orme the 
basis of her action in cancelling policies, and yet in this 
case, the Certificate of Mailing is missing and ap-
parently was always missing, according to the testimony 
of .1\Ir. Y ergensen; and furthermore, the copy of the 
Notice of Cancellation identified by Mrs. Roberts 
shows only Mark Lyon and his address as persons to 
whom the original might have been sent, and there is 
no testimony that postage was placed on the envelopes. 
Respondent asked the Trial Court to overlook all of 
these Inissing pieces of evidence and all of this evidence 
that the mailing routine broke down in this case and 
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indulgejl' the inference that X otice of Cancellation had 
been Inailed to the appellant and to accept that tenuous 
inference against the compelling testimony of ~Ir. 
Yergensen and :\Irs. Dobbs in behalf of the appellant 
that no Notice of Cancellation was ever received· in 
their office, and that had it been received, they would 
haYe taken steps to replace the insurance (R. 7-J.. 80-83). 
This Court should hold that there was no competent 
proof that Notice of Cancellation was ever mailed to 
the .Appellant and that the policy was still in full force 
and effect on the date the loss occurred in October, 
19li9. 
POINT III. IF THE INSURANCE POLICY 
'V . .:\..S IX FORCE, APPELLANT CAN RE-
COVER AFTER INTENTIONAL DESTRUC-
TION. 
The Loss Payable Clause (Exhibit 3) provides 
tlm t the insurance shall be paid to the lienholder and: 
''shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect 
of the Lessee, Mortgagor or Owner of the within 
described automobile nor by any change in the 
title or ownership of the property; provided, 
however, that that conversion, embezzlement or 
secretion by the Lessee, .:\Iortgagor or Purchaser 
in possession of the property insured under a 
bailment lease, conditional sale, mortgage or 
other encumbrance is not covered under such 
policy, unless specifically insured against and 
premium paid therefor * * * ." 
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This is known as the Standard Clause, sometimes called 
the Union Clause, which is to be distinguished from 
the Open Mortgage Clause which makes the mort-
gagee's right derivative from the mortgagor's and 
which, therefore, cannot exceed the mortgagor's rights. 
In Vol. 5 of Couch on Insurance, Section 1215 (b) 
at pages 4439 to 4440, that learned writer states that 
the standard or union clause effects a separate contract 
with the mortgagee, which is not invalidated by acts 
of the mortgagor, listing all types of losses and failures 
and conduct as not vitiating the protection of the mort-
gagee including: 
"in further illustration of facts and circum-
stances which have been held not to avoid a policy 
containing a standard or union mortgage clause, 
as to the mortgagee, may be noted the act of the 
mortgagor in destroying the insured building 
by burning it, * * * . " 
citing the cases of Wagner vs. Peters_, 142 Va. 412, 128 
SE 445, where there was clearly no liability to the 
insured, but stating that there might be liability to 
the creditor under the mortgage clause, and Common-
wealth vs. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 141 NE 510, in which the 
insured conveyed the premises, without notice, and 
either fired the building or went away and let it burn, 
and the Court held that in neither case was the policy 
invalidated as to the mortgagee. 
Volume 5 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice 
is similar and in Section 3401 at page 554 distinguishes 
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betwee11 the open Joss payable clause, which sitnply 
provides that: 
"Loss, if any, is payable to B as his interests 
shall appear." 
and the standard or union form, which contains the 
language above quoted that the insurance: 
"shall not be inntlidated by any act or neglect 
of the mortgagor or the owner of the within de-
scribed property." 
.. And at page 560 this treatise says: 
·'.A distinction which is rather important to 
grasp is that the policy terms are themselves 
not nullified by a standard mortgage clause. It 
is, rather, that a new contract containing those 
provisions is made with the mortgagee person-
ally; and the mortgagee is not bound by the mort-
gagor's contract which, while it may be identical 
in language, may be breached by the mortgagor's 
ad. In other words, the indemnity of the mort-
gagee is not placed at the whim of his debtor, and 
is subject only to breaches of which the mort-
gagee is, himself, guilty. It has been properly 
stated that in some instances, certain of the pro-
visions of the fire policy are modified and, under 
certain conditions, even omitted In~ the new 
agreement which springs from th~ mortgage 
clause and the insurance policy." 
And at page 561, the sa1ne author contrasts this by 
saying: 
"In the open form, the indemnity of the mort-
gagee is subject to the risk of every act and neg-
lect of the mortgagor which would avoid the 
original policy in the mortgagor's hands." 
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Similar is a discussion in 29 American Juris pru-
dence on Insurance, Sections 731 and 732, where it is 
said at page 990 that fraudulent statements in procur-
ing insurance, do not defeat the morgtagee, nor does 
holding under a fraudulent conveyance. 
"Similarly, a breach by the mortgagor of a 
clause in an automobile collision policy to the 
effect that the policy does not apply while the 
automobile is used in any illict trade or transpor-
tation, being a condition not relating to the sub-
ject matter of the insurance, does not affect the 
rights of the mortgagee." 
citing Piedmont Fire Insurance Co. vs. Fidelity ltlort-
gage Co., 250 Ala. 609, 35 So. 2d 352. This case holds 
that the policy determines such things as the property 
covered, amount, rate and terms; but otherwise the 
standard or union clause makes a separate and inde-
pendent contract between insurer and mortgagee. 
This Court in Commercial Credit Corporation vs. 
Premier Insurance Co., supra, held that the rights of 
the loss payable payee are independent of the rights 
of the insured, although limited in that case to can-
cellation of the policy by the insured. 
Tarleton vs. DeVeuve., C.A. 9, 113 Fed. 2d 290, 
states that the standard clause is an independent con-
tract and protects the mortgagee despite the non-pay-
ment of premiums and against cancellation, and: 
"shall not be invalidated by any act of the 
owner, means that it shall not be injuriously 
impaired or affected thereby." 
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Federal Insurance Co. vs. 11amiami Trail 1'onrs, 
C'.i\. 5, 117 .Fed. :!d 794, 796, holds that the provisions 
:>f a fire poliey on a bus with the standard or union 
dause Inakes an independent contract and the proYi-
~tons: 
"inure to the contracts of both owner and 
Inortgagee, and are enforceable by either, unless 
the fault of one or the other or both has stripped 
him of his power to enforce." 
Ramsey vs. Farmers 1llutual Insurance Co., 2:>-t 
:\lo. Appeal 1102, 139 S'Y 2d 10:!7 at 1029, says that 
the open Inortgage clause makes the mortgagee's rights 
no greater than the mortgagee's, but the "union'' clause: 
"Establishes a separate contract of insurance 
between the mortgagee and the insurer, which 
contract may not be nullified by any act of in-
sured alone." 
In Oklahoma State Union vs. Folsom, Okla. 
1958, 3:25 P. 2d 1053, an action was brought for loss 
under a fire policy on a farm building which was a 
brooder house and should have taken a higher rate. It 
was argued that this invalidated the policy ab initio, 
despite which the Court held the mortgagee's interest 
would not be defeated, citing from an earlier Okla-
hmna case, JV estern Insurance Co. vs. Hughes, 179 
Okla. :25-J., 66 P. 2d., 1956, that the mortgagee's contract 
was cmnpletley independent of the insured's rights and 
would be Yalid even though the insurance policy was 
void ab initio. 
Respondent raised the point before the trial court 
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that recovery by the appellant should be limited to 
"direct and accidental loss" since that was the general 
coverage of the insurance policy. This would be con-
trary to the foregoing authorities, which hold that the 
rights of the mortgagee go beyond those of the mort-
gagor and the mortgagee is protected against any act 
of the mortgagor. The language of the loss payable 
clause is itself proof that the loss payable has no such 
limitations. Loss from concealment, embezzlement, or 
conversion would likewise not be direct or accidental 
loss, and yet coverage as to those causes is specifically 
excluded from the loss payable clause unless a special 
premium is paid; which is another way of saying that 
those losses would be covered'Rnless excluded by the 
language of the clause. In a similar way, loss from 
other acts of the mortgagor, such as intentionally 
destroying the vehicle, are covered if they result from 
an act of the mortgagor, because they have not been 
specifically excluded from the loss payable clause. 
The different situations of mortgagor and mort-
gagee are indicated by 29 Am . .J ur. on Insurance, Sec-
tion 731, which concludes with the statement that the 
restriction is on the mortgagor only and that he could 
not recover under the policy even if he paid the loss 
and sought to be subrogated to the mortgagee's rights, 
'vhich are admitted to exist despite the conduct of the 
mortgagor, which would prevent his own recovery. 
It thus appears that the plain language of the loss 
payable clause has been held to mean what it says, 
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rwmely that the loss payable payee will haYe his rights 
ttnd that the protection will not be invalidated by "ally 
ad or neglect of the lessee, mortgagor, or owner." There 
are two customary forms of clauses used b"' insurance 
cmnpanies, and the difference between thern is whether 
or not the Inortgagee's rights go beyond those of the 
Inortgagor. Respondent in this case must be held to 
know this difference, and should now be held to respond 
to the claim of loss by the appellant in the absence of 
any showing that the appellant was in any way con-
nected with intentional destruction of the vehicle. Of 
course, there was no such claim made. 
SlJl\I~IARY '}llND CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's judgment in favor of respondent 
is based upon two unsupported conclusions of law. 
First, that respondent's policy was cancelled as to ap-
pellant; and, second, that respondent's policy did not 
protect appellant against intentional destruction by the 
insured. 
In attempting to establish that their policy was 
cancelled as to appellant, respondent relied solely upon 
an ordinary business routine and practice. This finding 
must fail as a matter of law because respondent failed 
to establish an ordinary business routine and practice in 
the following respects: 
1. They failed to introduce any testimony from 
the individual who actually deposits Notices of Cancel-
lation in the mail ; 
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2. They failed to introduce any Certificate of Mai 
ing; and 
3. Their Exhibit 4 contains only the name of tl 
insured and does not mention appellant. 
Contrast this incomplete business routine and prac 
tice with the direct proof from four witnesses as t 
non-receipt of any Notice of Cancellation. Responder 
not only failed to establish any evidence whatsoevc: 
from which the Court could find that Notice of Car 
cellation had been mailed but also failed in their proo 
that appellant received Notice of Cancellation as r( 
quired by the loss payable clause. 
In Point III, appellant has shown that appellan 
does have a right of recovery from respondent unde 
the Loss Payable Clause even though the truck wa 
intentionally destroyed by the insured, Mark Lyon. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully request 
this Court to reverse the Trial Court and enter judg 
ment in favor of appellant and against responden 
U.S.F. & G. in the sum of $3,250.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HAR1 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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